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SAFETY IN AIIU?LAifEFL IGHT.*
BY H* Brunat.
By devoting its first sessions to the investigation of
suitable means for increasing the safety of airplane flight,
the ‘lSocieteFrancaise de Navigation Aeriennetl emphasized, the
importance of this question. This is the first time that
technical men belonging to all lines of aviation have met to
exchange their views on safety and discuss the results of
their studies, observations, and experiments. This coopera–
.
tion will enable all the aspects of the problem of safety to
be investigated as completely as can be done at the present
time.
The present report is intended to give an accurate idea
of each of the probiams arising from accidents. In this re–
port I shall repeat certain statements which I have already
made in previous reports. I apologize for this repetition,
although I believe it is useful, since all the profit has not
yet been derived from the lessons taught by experience.
*Comw.unicatio-nby H. Brunat of the llServi”cede la Navigation
Ae’rie-nnellto the 11Soci6t6Francaise de Navigation A6rienne,1t
November 10, 1926.
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Enlistiflentand.Trainii~g of Aviators
It was pointed out at one of the earlier conferences, held
:> .,,...
in this place, that 54? of the accidents in French aviation
(civil, military, naval and colonial), were due to professional
and piloting errors. These accidents are extremely grave, being
the cause of 622 of the deaths and 63% of the injuries in avia–
tion. Professional and piloting faults result from errors of
judbment which in most cases are due to a lack of general and
technical knowledge.
Although the developmeilt in aeronautical construction is
marked every year by the creation of swifter aircraft which
carry heavier loads and have a longer radius of action, thus
calling for a steadily increasing professional knowledge Ori
the part of the crcwj the methods of enlisting pilots have not
cha-nged since the end of the war. Upon close examination, it
appears that the “previous instruction of most of OIJ,Xstudent
pilots has ‘oecn quite inadequate, so that they are unable to
acquire the necessary professional and technical knowledge for
safely piloting modern aircraft, particularly commercial air-
planes and seaplanes.
In my opinion, the best way to improve this state of af–
fairs would consist in starting a campaign, exclusively among
young ;,]enhaving a thorough >enoralC,aducation (college students
and pupils of high schools), for enlisting student pilots. At-
tempts “havealready been made along this line, but without
I I
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much success. .This failure is probably due to,a bad method.
Stud..ents,wer.eexpected to take up work at aviation schools,
thereby almost entirely abandoning their regular studies.
This plan was naturally opposed ‘oytheir families.
Still
vialed for.
lessly all
the interests of all concerned could be easily pro-
Instead of having flying schools scattered aim-
over the country, they should be concentrated in
the vicinity of university towns. The
expected to abandon their studies, but
should be so arran~ed that they can be
students should not be
the aviation courses
attended by students
d.Uriilg their free time. In case of necessity, agreements
could probably be made with the universities for changing the
hours of certain lectures. The training of students enrolled
under cuch conditions would necessitate a longer period of in-
struction which, however, should not exceed a year. I do not
beli?ve there is any serious objection to such a method of
recruit ing, which wouZd p~ovide high-grade aviator~ capable of
receiving the special technical instruction required for air
navi,gaticn. In
above method of
ty, an adequate
order to make sure that the application of the
enlistment will result in an increase of safe–
training method for pilots should be worked
out and standardized in our schools. This WOUIU require the
education of special licensed pilot trainers. In addition to
being an excellent pilot, the ‘trainermust also be a good
teacher.
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Likewise the training airplanes must be adapted to school
purposes. These airplanes should be adapted to “all conditions
of flight, in order to give the trainer a chance to show the
pup il, without danger, the maneuvers required to correct a spin,
to regain lost speed and to land from different altitudes and
different directions with regard to the landing field. Of
course the stude-ntshould be trained on intermediate airplane
types, before piloting the airplane which he is expected to
fly in regular service, when he should again familiarize him-
self with all the maneuvers mentioned above.
Sui-tablemethods of recruiting and training pilots should
produce a considerable reduction in the number of acoidents.
But this alone would not provide our air force with the number
of commanders and long-distance pilots which it is ,n.owbegin–
ning to need and which will be absolutely necessary in the near
futu TC, as soon ns we possess airplanes of Greater :~pacity
and lunger radius of actim.
We are in urgent nee~ of a high school for aviators. Un–
less such a school is created within the near future, we m?.y
not have enough trained aviators with sufficient experience for
pilobing u,~rlarge civil, military, and naval air-planes. Diff i–
culties are already being encountered by civil aviation in se-
curing the requisite personnel. The idea of this school is not
‘new. In i924, following a communication from Mr. Devaluez, the
lfSocie’te’F~ancaise de Navigation A&rienne’l considered this ques-
11 .
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t ion. It consulted the air transportation companies and.lead–
ing men of the aeronaut ic~.1world, who seemed to regard the
~.deaWit’nparticular interest. Mr. Laurent .Eynac, who was then
Under–Secretary of State for Aeronautics and Air Transportation
favored the idea. The matter was dropped, however, and must
now be takeilup again on an entirely new basis. An especial
effort must also be inadea,sregards mechanics.
The only schools, wb.ic’nat the present time have an excel-
lent or~aniza,tionjare those which train mechanics for military
aviation. The apprenticeship of young soldiers of around twenty
years of a.g-e,who work as mechanics, does not exceed one year.
This period is obvicusly too short to make c:~purtmechanics.
This vim is justified by the difficulties enco-mtered by air
transportation companies in securing competent mechanics, al–
thou~h there is no 1~.ckof candidates.
~?.1~l~,!l:~ir.ls~ L12CdS ei~};<.netroubles durin[;flight are due
to 13c1ccf ratchfulnl:ficsby the ]~lechanics. They a e the cause
of approxiixately 570 of the deaths and 19~~of the injuries in
aviation, in a.?.ditionto important i-flaterial losses. It is man-
ifest thah t-henumber of accidents would b e reduced and.Nxmn
lives saved, if the mi~ services had better-trained mech?.-nics.
In i~Y opinion the trouble vith the present system is that a mil-
itary mechanic is pre-ventea from being promoted to a ~ig~~[~~
rank which would enable him to earn a.good livi;lgfor himself
and fal?lily.This is the reason why mechanics leave the arifiyas
I
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soon as they are through witil their terms of enlistment; that is$
when, owing to acquired experience, they begin to be more useful.
The creation of a corps of airplane mechanics similar to
the corps of naval mechanics, n?ight remedy t-hisstate of affairs.
Good results have already been obtained in the.navy where a me-
,chanic with a good education, such as a graduate of l’L!Ecoledes
Arts et Metiers,!! might become an officer–mechanic and reach a
comparatively high rank. Military aviation would be thus pro-
vided wit’ha permanent staff of en~ineers and foremen-mechanics
(commissioned officers and noncommissioned officers) duly quali-
fied to insure the best conditions of upkeep and repair. The
creation of such a corps would be no actual expense to the state.
The economies of materiel would rapidly make up for the invest-
m ent. The fact that excellent reserves for civil aviation are
formed by demobilized officers and noncommissioned officers of
the corps of mc.chanics, n,’~stalso be borne in mind.
Improvements of the Airplane Pro-per
The numezms accidents referred to abovej which we~e attrib-
utable to mron~ malicnlvers,are partly accounted for by imperfect
construction. llxce~tfor certain types, existing airplzn.es lack
inherent
iency of
position
stability. The speed range is too sw.ail,the effic-
the tail gZOUp insufficient in stalled flight ar.dthe
of the ailerons dangerous when their action is exert-
ed at the minimum critical speed.
!!f],,,,,
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The problem of stability
Ho l
has
438
already received
7
considerable
attention and satisfactory results have been obtained by some
designers. Airplanes fly at a determined engine speed, without
the pilot having to touch the controls. On losing speed, these
ai~lanes flatten out automatically after the strictly nscessa–
ry glide to regain t’nelost sgeed. Start ing from any normal
position of flight they flatten out without the aid of the
pilot and take up a line of flight correspondin~ to the
speed. Their maneu-verability is go~d and the action of
co-ntrols insta~lta-neous.
engine
their
Some des~.gners a,ndtechnicians have devoted their efforts
to the prablem of stability, whereas the importance of this
question is deiliedby other constructors, who consider that its
sol-~i;ionwould necescari”.y be detri~ental to other qualities
of the aizplane. Althou~h this may be true, inherent stability
is wch ail iinportanifac [or of sa.fety that it must be developed
even if perfoinances are reduced which, however, has never bsen
d emonstrated.
In a recent ac,cidenta student pilot owed his life to the
excellcn t inher~nt stability and maneuverability of his air–
planf?. OT~ingto a wrong maneuver, he stalled ~mt.30 or 40 meters
(98 or 131 feet) abwre the ground. The airplai~e slipped but
flattened out before striking the ground. The airplane cwld
‘not have been righted after such a short drop, if it had not
possessed the qualities referred to above, and the accident
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would have had more serious consequences.
Investi~tion should be made of the action of the control
surfaces ar.dail”eronsat the critical speed for sustentation.
the
It is quite evident that if, by some cievice,/rudders could be
made effective at the critical speed, “means would at last be
provided for correcting the instability which precedes stalling,
thus avoiding a spin and consequently re–establishi”ng the sta–
bility of the airplane mere quickly. Also it seems that the
spin couid be greven-ted by the ailerons if they were designed
and arranged for exerting a sufficient moment around the axis
passing t’nrou,~hthe center of gravity of the airplane. These
problems remain to be solved.
A differential aileron control has already been invented.
By operatin~ this control, one aileron can be sharply raised,
whi~ e the other is only slightly lowered, thus straightening
the ai~~”lane laterally antibringing it into a gen~,le giflde.
Under these ccnditir.nsa maneuver of the ailerons cannot reduce
the speed of the airplane and cause stalling. Another ad~nt.
age of this aileron control is the resulting smoothness of the
maneuvex ~ which causes less fatigue to the pilot. The general
adoption of this ccntrol is desirable.
An ei~ormous increase in safety could be o~~tainedby reduc-
ing the take-off and landing speeds to 40 or 50 lan/h(24.9 or
31 mi./hr.). On the other hand, this advantage should not be
counterbalanced by an excessfve reduction of the cruising speed,
as the airplane would then be of no practical use. This im-
———.——..-—_
.—— —.
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portant question may yet be solved by means of a device which
we are now unable to conceive. Its discovery,,.however, may
>..-, .,,,.
still be in the distant future, and it would be unwise to rely
on it for a solution of which we are now urgently in need.
A simple device, the Handley Page slotted wing, is availa-
ble and gives satisfactory results. By means of this wing the
pilot is able to increase the lift or drag at his convenience.
It is like a speed gear applied to the airplane. I ‘Deli~ve
that investigations ought to be based on this idea and direct-
ed first toward devices designed to create a zone of negative
pressure on the upper surface of the wing to support the air–
plane at cruising speed.
Zxcept for the remarkable De La Cierva autogiro, the im-
provei,lentsand applications of which it is difficult to antic–
ipa.te, the easy method outlined above will take precedence
over the method of reducing landing and take--off speeds ‘ry
means of variable wicg camber and wing area, cwing to the dif–
ficulties involved in the practical a: ‘~ication of the latter
method. However, the prcblem of simultaneous variation of cam-
ber and”area sfi.cwldnot be neglected as a very considerable
speed range might be obtained by its solution.
Designers should be recommended to build comfortable cock–
.
pits, ””al”thoughthis point i~aYat first appear to be of less
importance, Accidents attributed to wrong maneuvers are some-
times due to excessive fatigue of the pilot, whose ”physical
. ..-.—.—.- .-..—
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fitness has become irilpairedtoward the end of a long flight,
owing to lack of comfort. It should be attempted to obtain
.,,.,. ,-.
,.
the maximum sinoothness of the controls by reducing the number
of pulleys, carefully calculating the length of the horns,
and the position and dimensions of the balancing surfaces.
Airplanes should be designed so as to be easily flown by the
average pilot.
The danger of stalling can also be diminished by special
devices suitably adapted to the airplane. I recall the fact
that the adaptation of a special device was suggested in 1923,
this device to act automatically on the elevator control when
the airpla-ne reached its minimum critical speed. Canstantin
and Bramson have since developed different types of this de-
vice. A report clealingWith their inventions will probably
b e s’~lxmittedby each
will be considczably
aut omatic.allyon the
rcaches its critical
of them. Without any doubt, the safety
increased by t’hesedevices, which act
elevator control as soon as the airplane
angle of attack.
Fortuilaten!-y,only a very small number of accidents is due
to failure of tilecell in flight. Still such cases do occur
and there is no apparent reason for them. Strange as this may
seem, old airplane t’ypesare less subject to failure than mod-
ern ones. Old airplanes are all provided with thin wings.
The effects of air pressure on such wings have become suffici-
ently known for different cases of flight, to enable the de-
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termination of a method of static tests for discovering the
weak points of the aircraft. On the other hand, these air-
!, ..-,
pl~nis are p~ev&~ed by their considers’~le”drag from reaching
very high speeds. Thus the pilot is able to flatten ‘out, even
at the maximum diving speed, without imposing excessive stresses
on his airplane. This means that tilefailure of a wing on an
airpla-ne of a-nold type might be attributed. to the failure of
some poorly assembled -part,fitting, bolt or joint, or to some
inherent defect overlooked by the inspection service. Certain
failures mig?~talso be attributed to the excessive tension of
the brace wires having absorbed, at rest, part of the factor of
safety of the airplar.e. Careful and frequent inspection should
further redu~cethe number of accidents. There appears to be
another cause for failures on modern airplanes. They do not
seem to be due to local defects, but rather to the stresses
which, in certain cases of flig’nt, exceed the stresses antici-
pated in the static tests and in’the calculations of the de-
signer.
Airplanes of ~;reatfineness ratio (L/D) are particularly
subj ect to failure at their maximum diving speeds. These air–
planes can actually reach very high diving speeds so that the
stresses may exceed.the factor of safety, particularly if the
airplane is pulled out,of a.d.ive too sud’denly. A few months ago
an i-nvestigation of the failure in flight of an airplane having
a high fi-neness ratio s’nowedthat the failure occurred af–
ter pulling out of a long clive. The ,rearwing strut was bent
1
—.
at right angles by compression while th,efront strut was torn
..
from its fittings by traction. The re~+ member of the landing-
,.
gear V-strut, broken by the shock of the cell dropping backward,
was found near the spot where the wing had fallen to the ground.
It is evidenced by all these facts that the position of the cen-
ter of lift must have been aft of the wings when the break oc-
curred. It is therefore probable that the airplane @ve “way
while being pulled out of the dive, it being possible for its
angle of attack at that moment to reach a considerable value.
The details of this accident are given to show that the loads
imposed on the rear spar may under certain conditions, exceed the
loads which the front spar can support in other cases.
In any case it follows from these accidents that calcula-
tions and static tests, for the determination of airplane char-
acteristics, must be based on the results of full–scale tests in-
volving measurements, at high speeds.and under all conditions of
flight, of the magnitude, direction and distribution of pressure
on the given wing sections. Such tests may reveal lack of
strength of some structural parts in certain cases of flight,
thus putting the constructors under the obligation of reinforc-
ing the weak parts of the wings.
of weight which might result from
with a slight displacement of t-he
In order to avoid the
these reinforcements,
center of lift should
increase
wings
be de-
signed. This solution would enable the concentration in one
point of all the elements determining the strength of the wings.
However, at the present time it would be well to equip all
Ij
/
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aircraft of great fineness ratio with air–speed indicators grad–
uat ed for very high speeds. Moreover, the attention of the pi-
lots should be called to the maximum critical speed not to be
exceeded and at which the airplane can still be flattened out
without danger of rupture. A device might also be designed for
controlliilg automatically the flattening out “maneuver when the
airplane is about to reach its maximum critical speed. The
production of such a device based on the air speed of the air-
plane would appear to be quite simple.
Improvement of the Power Plant
Safety in flight largely depends on the proper functioning
of the engine. Next to fog, engine trou-ble is what the pilots
fear most, since it may force a landing when no suitable land-
ing place is in sight. According to statistics, 22% of the ac–
cidents are attributed to engine failures. As a matter of fact,
this figure is really much higher, since engine failures fol-
lowed by partial crashes without injury to the crew are not al-
ways reported to the department in charge of collecting infor-
mation regarding causes of accidents. The reported brealalowns
are due to the following causes given in order of their frequen-
cy: failure of one of the engine parts; poor circulation of
water; lack of lubrication of some part; imperfect carburetion;
deficient ignition.
The parts most frequently subject to failure are: valves
and controls, springs, valve rockers, a-ridvalve–rocker pins.
,,--
.. —
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Next come failures due to piston troubles. In this connection,
the new engine types represent real improvements. Connecting
.
rod breaks ccme
They are mosxly
types, failures
last and are consta”ntly decreas ifig“in number.
due to deficient Iu’orication. On old engine
were often due to small cracks in the water
jacket. These accidents may be attributed to unequal expan-
s ion of the different engine parts.
Poor water circulation is due to vibration, deficient up
keep of the radiators, to leaks in loose or neglected joints,
and sometimes to failure or bad functioning of the water pump
in which the p’:,~pvane is scpara.ted from its axle after failure
of the rivets.
culation micht
serve water to
Forced landing brought about by bad water cir–
often be avoided by an increased vclume of re-
replace a slight loss of water in flight.
Fa,ilures due to poor oil.circulation occur wliena pipe is
.
stopped up by sone foreign substance> Sinila~ conditions are
produced by poor carb’.iretion,which is most~iydue tb a partial
stopping of the rubber tubzng by disintegrs,tel particles of rub-
ber at the joints. Fa~ced landing caused by deficient ignition
is generally due to neglect of tkm ma~netos.
It appears from the above statements that most breakdowns
are due to lack of in~pection and care of tb.e e~.giaes, so that
o
one might be tempted to throw alZ the blame cm the mechanics.
They have, however, some excuse in the complicated arrangement
of the power plants wh~eh renti~::sthe inspec~iGn of certain
parts particularly difficult. on some airplanes the engine is
-.
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mountcd in such a way that the removal of a magneto is exceed-
ingly difficult. It is easily understood how.a mechanic,
,....
pressed for time, mi~ht neglect some important detail.
Such relations between airplane and engine illustrate the
importance of close cooperat ioilo“fthe aizplanc and engine con-
structors with the aviator. This cooperation might be obtained
by the adoption of a ‘lrent-and-sale’! system, according to which
the user would rent an airplane for a certain period, af$er
which he aGrees to buy it, if the conditions of the contract are
f ulf illecl..The airpla,ne and engine constructors would thus be
kept more closely in touch with their products and would be en-
abled to aesi.m new airplane and engine types better adapted to
the needs of the user. With reference to engine improvements,
the number of failures to which they are subject could be re-
duced by the elimination of valves and of water cooling. Sample
engines should be submitted to longer endurance tests on the
ground, this being the safest and most practical way to detect
defects and determine the value of the improvements.
The rotary engines of training ai~lanes should be equipped
with autolilaticcar”ouretors in order to increase their safety.
Every year several accidents are caused by student pilots inad-
vertently turning the mixture handle while absorbed in maintain-
ing the equilibrium of their airplane. This chokes the engine
and causes it to stall. These accidents might be avoided by
using automatic carburetors.
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Multi- eilginedairplanes, able to fly with one engine
stopped, are gradually coming into use on air transportation
—.
>
lines=’ This leads us to hope for the practical elimination of
forced landings, provided the engines are made easily accessi–
ble during flight, thus enabling the mechanics to make the nec-
essary repairs.
In view of tilefact that serious accident; due to fire
have recently been reported, all the available information as
to their causes and the efficacy of protecting devices is given
below. As I have already pointed out in previous reports, the
number and seriousness of coitilagrations in flight and on the
ground have increased, notwithstanding the protective ineans
employed, since powerful engines are being more extensively
used.
In 1923, when airplanes were
guishers, 12.C)9~of the deaths in
not equipped with fire extin-
French aviation were due to
conflagrations in flight. In 1924, efficient means of protec–
tion were provided and the percentage immediately dropped to
1.302. Since 1924 the deaths have increased and the percentage
has risen from 3.67? for 1925, to 13.232 for 1926, from January
1st to the present date (November 10). The deaths are increas-
ing in the same proportion for conflagmtions on the ground.
In 1923 they amounted to 16.07~. In 1924 the adoption of pro-
tective measures reduced the percentage to 11.76* which, how–
ever, rose to 17.27’? in 1925, and 22.46? in 1926.
,,,,-,.,.,,.,,,, ,,, ,,.-, ,,,,,, ,,, ,,, , , ,-,.-, -, , ,,, ,,,,..,...--,. .,,,.-.-—,--,.. .-.., ,-..,,,,,
,--
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An, exar,>ination of the causes of conflagrations in flight
shows Iih.at28-~0 ?.re d72e tO ka(;k-fi~in.ginto the carburetor, there-
by setti-ngfire to the ‘g,asolineesc,~pingfrom tb.e float chamber
or flowing back into the intake pipes Gr fiowing from a broken
pipe or loose joint, or i~niting the residues of oil and gasoline
accumulated in the cowling or ‘oetween the yews of cylinders;
24~0 to coiln~cti~~g-rodbreaks entailing either back-firing, set-
ting fire to the gasoline flowins throu~h the broken pipes, or
setting fire, through the broken piston, to the oil contained ill
the broken crank case; 6j~to engine troubles usually caused by
defects of the valves or of their distrib”~tion members; 4$ to
poor functioning of the ei~gines (without further details); 25
prcbably to rupture of an ignition wire near a spark plug of a
rotary engine, the wire coming into contact
bearer soaked with gasoline and oil; 2$ to
fire. It vm.snot possible to determine the
maining 34~~of the fires.
with the engine
rockets catchi-ng
causes of the re-
Notwithstanding t-hefact that certain causes of fire may
have escaped our atteiltion, we have gatherecl enough information
to show that most conf]-agrations in flight were caused by ‘back-
firing and fa.~.luresof connecting rods. Uildcr these conditions,
it is reaso~mble to coi~cludethat there is no dailger of confla-
grantion if ‘~heflames
not come into co-ntact
line and oil.
burst inz forth iilthe engine cowling d.o
with infl~iflmablemat erials, such as gaso-
Efforts should be directed along this line. The presence
I
11
,
of oil tnnks, filters, decant ers or fuel-pump damping devices
should not be tolerated inside the engine cowling. Preference
>,, . ,,.-
should b e given to those engines in whic”nthe crank case is not
us ed as an oil tank. The development of devices capable of
prevent ins back-f iring from reaching the carburetor should be
cent inuede The use of special carburetors which are proof
a~ainst back-firing is particularly recommended. AS stated
fabovc, conflagrations “due to back-firing were caused by leal@-ge
which resclted in deficient delivery of fuel to the engine.
Leakage is therefore particularly serious, as it may cause back–
firing .Zlild. at ‘thesame tine’create r;lostfavorable conditions
for the further development of the conflagration.
The ~;~eatcst care is recommended with reference to fuel and
oil pipes and to tileti@tness of the co.onections. Two types of
COnil~CtiOnS are now
i?let~lconncctioris.
conbusti-r>l.eand may
dit ion. The latter
ing of the pipes to
weight. Both types
available: ru’oberconnections and flexible
The trouble with the former is that they are
stop up the pipes when they are in bad con–
are not flexible enough-and cause the break-
whit-hthey are attached by their additional
are therefore o“~jecti”onable,and a third one
should he sought, wi~ichwill remedy the above-mentioned defects. ,
Instead of using these connect ions w’nich“may cause serious acc i—
‘dents, it would be better to use jointless pipes integral with
the device, flexibility being obtained, after annealing, by
several coils arranged in clifferent planes.
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Back-firing nay cause fire iilthe carburetor for the follow-
...
ing reason: In general, the air–intake scoops on the outside of
the ccwling are neithe~ firmly secured nor sufficiently strong.
Consequeiltly, they are separated from the tubing or are blown
,off by violent hack-–fire. I was p ersonall.ypresent at engine
tests when air scoops, wlnichappeared to be well secured, were
hurled several ~L@ters away by an ~XplOSiOn. Of course the air
scoops on t-hisCmpanyy s airplanes were immediately reinforced,
with the result tilatno uore confla~rations occurred which
could be attributed simply to back-firing.
Back-firinS, which r:ightbe considered ne@igible on low-
powcred en~incs, i~ay, if ‘noprecaut ion-sare ta.’ken,entail ser–
ious consequences on modern en~ines. T“he~reat amount of gas
containetL in th. ~ tu’~i~l~ of po~-~erfulengines maY produce quite a
serious deflagrat ion, wherefore the air scoops i~ustbc strong
and solidly attached. I?lames produced by back-firing may set
fire to the fuel falling back into the air– intake pipes, since
the fuel passing through the spraying nozzle is not all drawn
in by the en~ine. Very often ‘~hedelivery of the carburetors is
unequal, so that sor-leof the ~msoli-nefalls back into the air
pipes. Apparently this trouble is due to bad dcsi.gnand bad lo-
cat ion of the air scoops.
In gcr!eral, tno air scoops are of equal length and directed
toward the front of the airpla,ile. They are st~ck at a certain
a-ngle by tk.epropeller slip stream. Owing to the fact that one
of the air scoops sli~htly overlaps the other, the air is drawn
=-”--- ,,,-.*nf,., ,, ,,, , i Jm—.—.,., ,--, .,.-,,.,, . , , , . .--— . .———.
in (iiffcrcntlyby
engine. This ua,s
... wheze a w.oistair
each scGop, r~otwithstaridin.gthe action of the
confirmed on a twin-e:lgineairplane in flightj
scoop could be “seen. It was again confirmed
by consumptio-n tests during which each carburetor was supplied
with fuel from a differer.t tank. For a 300 .HP.en~ine, the
consumption varied from 10 to 15 liters (2.6 to 4 gallons) per
hour for an absolutely identical a~LjustKlentof the carburetors.
To avoid these troubles the air scoops should face the propel-
ler slip stream Znd be placed in different planes to prevent ‘
overlapping.
Conflagrations durir..<stunts are mo,st liable to oocur w’hen
the pilot
that tilis
deficient
sudd~rll ~ 0~ enF3 the “Lkrottlevalve. It is possible
sudGen openi-rig,which alone ir,sufficient to entail
deliVCT-~?.-nd::OrlSeq~entbaCk-fi Tin~, has coincided
with a i112JneUV~rof acce>(:ration, wk.ic’nwould have rcduccd the
qu~,ntity of fuc],delivcrctl to the carburetor. On certain air–
planes where the i~ip~s e~lteredthe carb-~rctorfrom the back, a
partial emptying Of the float chamber was noted shortly after
the pilot opened the throttle wide to reach the take-off speed.
Back-firings occurred and the pilot had to start over again.
Attention m,asfinally given to the inertia of -thefuel in t’he
pipes, which were then modified by being first extenacd to the
front of the engine and th.eil
,,-.
present time the delivery is
celebration of th_e,airplar.e
ed ‘oack to the carburetor. At ihe
perfect under all conditions of ac-
Owing to the fact that deficient
I
d.elivery
pipes is
One
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WY entail back-firing, the above arrangement of the
pait icularly advisable for pursuit airplanes.
nodern enSinc type has air– intake pipes leading from a
single air scoop. Althou,gh this engine has not yet “~een subject
to confl.aj<~ations in fl.ighi,at’:ention is called to the danger
involved by t’nisarrangement in case of back-firing. Flames
b reakine; fort’nf~om one of the pipes will uridoubtedly set fire
to the gas contained in tho other pipes. Hence there sho~~ldbe
a sep~rate air scoop for each carburetor.
Cleanness of the ensine is a good guaranty against fire.
This is well ki~o~~[nby aviators who try to keep their engines as
clean as ‘Iqossiblc. In fact, the engines are clean at the start,
but not after half an ho~r of flight, because the oil becomes
too thiilat the high temperatures and 1ea-kst’nroughall the
joints. .4number of conflagrations haviil~been caused by the
oil catching fire, means should b e sought to obtain sufficient
viscosity ‘:0incure good mechanical tightness. There is only
one way to achieve this result, namely, to cool “the oil. Reccnt
tests sho:~edthat, owing to S1OVVcirculation, the oil leaving
the engine reached a temperature of 90° as soon as the engine
was started. Since many airplane en~ines are subject to this
trouble, it is particularly important to study the circulation
of the oil, ia order,to preve-nt it from reaching temperatures
which will appreciably reduce its viscosity. Moreover, the
snifting valves shoqld connect dire’ctlywith the external air
I
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in order to avoid. the proj ection of oil or the formation of car–
bureted. gases inside the engine cowling.
Only 2? of the conflagrat ions on airplanes equipped with
rotary en~ines were ascribed to the contact of an igmition wire
with the engine bearer covered with fuel and oil.residues. On
the other hand, since the causes of 34~0of the conflagrations
on airplanes equipped with fixed engines are unknown, it may be
a.ssunecltha,tsome of them are.attributable to deficient ignition.
Attention is ca].ledto the following precautions against
fire: good insulation and st~ength of the ignition wires, insu-
lation of the spark–plug-wire connections on their outer surface,
adoption of an ignition distributor which will reduce the length
of the insulated wires to a minimum and, lastly, tightness of
the magnetos. Owinz to the fact that these precautions have not
always been taken, I will al-somention that fuel pipes should
not lie above ma~netos or ignition wires, since a drop of fuel,
falling at the instant when a spark is produced, may set fire to
the airplane.
After having enumerated all the causes of fires which have
occurred in flight since”1923, means of preventing them from
spreading and becoming dangerous, will now be considered. Of
course fire would not spread if it ‘hadnothing to feed on. The
,.
i~eans indicated for avoiding fire, such as the remom,l of all
tanks and strainers containing fuel and oil from the engine cowl-
ing, wouid likewise prevent it from spreading. In additiorito
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these precautions, no wooden parts should be placed inside of
the engine cowling, as they easily get soaked with fuel and oil.
In a great number of accidents the fire was fed by fuel and
oil flowing from a broken pipe, a loose connection, or one
which had actually burned. In addition to researches for find-
ing a suitable connection, a check ‘valve should be invented
which, being placed in the fuel tank, would automat ically cut
off the sup~ly from the fuel pipe if it or any of its connec-
tions should break. The problm is very difficult, but its solu-
tion does not appear impossible. The operat ion of the check
valve above referred to might clepend on the speed of the fuel
f1Ow. Its presence on airplanes would be of great service.
Nearly all conflagrations in flight resulted in the death
of the crew when the flavles,breaking forth from the er.gine
cowling, reached the fuel tanks. In some cases the fall was
precipitated by the ipstam.taneousdislocation of the tanks pro-
duced by the explosion of gasoline vaporsj which had collected
in the vicinity. The fireproof bulkheads used at the present
time are not sufficient to protect the tanks efficiently, when
they are located immediately behind the engines. Althou@ the
flames cannot melt the bulkheads, they easily pass by than and
reach the fuel tank, w-nichgives may at a joiv.tand allows its
contents to escape.
The problem has two possible solutions:
tank should not be placed imm6’dLhtely behind
Either the fuel
the engine, ox it
———.. -..,. .. . _ —. ,,..._ .,-
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should be efficiently protected. The first solution can be eas-
ily realized on mOderil cornmercial airplanes. The second also
~.ppea-rsto be quite easy ,Qndmight be obtained, not by placing
a sim~~.eprotection ~rallin front of the tar.k,but by actuallY
enclosing the tank in a fireproof housing. A sufficient air
layer might be j~rovitiedbetween the fireproof housing and the
t a.nls,fioodcirculation of the air being insured by a great
r.umber of openings covered with wire”~muze. The weight of such
a wall would b e insi~mificant. The wall could be made of sheet
asbestos covered on both sides with sheet duxalumin and fine
wire gauze.
Emptying the tanks, in order to avoid the spreading of the
fire was considered, but e::perinents showed that gasoline dis–
charged in flight was splashed over the fuselage and the tail
planes. After these tests, the idea of draining the tanks was
abanclonecl. The trouble with the draining devices was that they .
discharged the gasoline t’nroughthe bottom of the tanks. There-
fore, the results were not surprising and would probably have
b een the safieif the gasoline had been conctuctedto the bottom
of the landing gear. A possible solution would consist. in ex–
erting sufficient precsure inside the tailksto drive the gaso-
liile into a pipe opening at the rear end of the fuselage. Tanks
now in use could stand t-herequisite pressure. Tank-aropping
devices were installed, oilvarious types of airplanes and proved
to be an important means of preventing fires from spreading. In
20% of the cases the pilots escaped iijury when the tanks were
,,
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dropped.
The causes of fires on the ground were not so accurately
determined as the causes of fires during fli~ht, the crew being
either killed or una”ble to account for the accident. The infor-
mation ~mthered.on this question indicates t’nat: 47$ of the con- .
fl~.grations on the .syoundfollowed crashes due to stalling;
33.33% were caused by collisions in flight or by striking obsta-
cles in taking off or in landir.g; 15% were caused by pa~tial or
total eras’nesdue to bad landings; 1.5? were caused by falls
due to defects in the construction materials; 1.5fioccurred on
seaplanes and were due to the shock of phosphorous flare buoys
on the water after capsizing; 1.52 were due to circumstances
concerning w’hich-no information was received; 7.54$ of the con–
flagrations on the ground occurred on airplanes after flat land–
ings or landings on the nose, and it was fouildthat they were
due to a sudden increase in th.cengine speed folloring the
brcakin~ of the propellez. In these accidents the tanks were
not burst open by the shock and no @soline was splashed on the
mufflers.
These observations, in addition to those which I was able
to make for myself, a-ridthe fact that the number of conflagra—
tions on the ground increases and decreases in proportion to the
number of conflagrations in”flight, indicate that the most fre-
quent cause of conflagrations on the ground is back-firing coin-
cident with the breaking of the air SCOODS against the ground,
..—. ! . . . .. -- . . . . . . . - ., . . . . . —. —.._..,., .-., . .
.—
N.A.c. A. Technical Xemorandurn No. 438 26
the breaking of the pipes and sometimes the bursting of the
gasoline tanks. Measures for avoiding coilflagra’~ionsin flight
would therefore also reduce the danger of conflagrations on the
ground. However, it is prcbable that some of the fires were
also due to the crushing of the gasoline tanks against the muf–
flers at the moment when the carbureted mixture exploded in
them. This danger could be avoided by not placing the tanks
immediately behind the engines and by usi-ng long exhaust pipes
to coi~ductthe gases as far aft as possible.
In both cases fire is produced on the Sround because the
engine makes a few more revolutions. This is clearly proved by
the way in which the propellers were broken. Back-firing can
only be produced when there are burning gases in the cylinders.
Therefore, no fire ca-nbe produced if the ignition is switched
off. Pilots lm.owthe importance of switching off the ignition
to prevent confIa&rat ion oilthe ground a,ndthey do so whenever
they consider it advisable. It may happen, however, that after
the ignition is off the engine continues to revolve by self-
ig-nition. This very serious disadvantage, which considerably
increases the danger of accident, is due in Most cases to the
spark plugs which, for some unknown reason (defects of the
electrodes, excessive accuiiulatio-nof calamine deposits) main-
tain a sUfficicilttemperature to ignite the fuel mixture.
Tests were nade with different types of spark plugs, and it
appeared that with some of them the engine continued.to re—
V.OIVS after the ignition had been switched off, whereas with
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others t-heengine, maintained at [astrictly constant tempera-
ture, stopped as soon as the ignition was off. The choice of
spark plugs is very important with regard to conflagrations on
the ground.
Iilorder to further reduce the dancer of such accidents, a
device might be invented to step the engine in the shortest
possible time. It would seen that this result might be ob-
tained by introducing n neutrz,l gas into the intake pipe.
Thus the pilot would be provided with a safe means for
the ignition durin~ a fall or a landing on bad ground.
A considerable nmber of incipient fires occur on
stopping
the air–
port while the engine is being started or stopped. The ratio
between these two cases is 25 : 1. 98% of them were attributed
to back-firing and 2% to the ignition of gases in the muffler.
In one of these cases a pilo~ was bdly burned, who was unable
to escape quickly cnough to avGid an explosion which took place
near the tanks where gasoline vapors had collected. In another
instance, a mechanic was repairing the stor~agebatteries in an
airplane, when a spark jumped between two wires. At the same
time an explosion took place, this spark having set fire to
gasoline vapors between the lower part of the cockpit and t’he
bottom of the fuselage. These accidents demonstrate the advant-
age of providing the lower parts with outlets and of ventilating
all parts of the airplane w-here even small amounts of oil or
gasoline might accumulate. Before turning to the operation of
fire extin~wisl?ers, it sb.ouldbe noted that all the measures
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outlined a-oovewill lose -much of their importance when we uce
heavy–oil ei~ginesor a noninfIaimnable fuel.
~~~5@ of the fires’which occuired on the airport, while start-
ir.g or st”onping the engines, were put out by means of en.gi-ne
fire extinguishers alone. Tyieiraction was supplemented in 46$
of the fires by the hangar fi~e extineaishers. In the remain-
ing 4’$of the cases, the exting~ishers failed to stop the con-
flagrat ions and ‘~heairplanes were burned. The extinguishers
were less efficient in flight, where only 7. 5~0 of tliecor.fiagra-
tions nere stopped by engine fire extinguishers; 570by m cans
of engine and hand ex-binc~is’hers; 2.5’$by means of ‘hande:~tin–
gu ishers alone; 30~0spread
of the engine cxtir.Oaishers
most casesj hut ,,~ere“Qu~ ed
selves; 2.5% occurred near
more slowly after
and the airplanes
the fuact ioning
could land in
on the ground; 2.5% sto9peL of them=
the ground and were put out by r-leans
of kanGa,r extinguishers; in 12.5% of the cases the attempts to
use the extir.guishers failed;
.
in 12. 5~0 of the cases the extir--
guishers were operated without benefit; in 12.5~0of cases the
extillquishers were not used. No information is available in 15%
of’ the cases.
The above figures show that in 42.5~0of the cases the extin–
guishers weye useful, but that the airplanes were burned in most
of the cases. When conflagrations occurred on.the ground after
the airplane had cr,ashed, the fire extinguishers were of no use.
The time required to start an extinguisher was often ‘Goolong to
enable the pilot to use it. On the other hand, the design of
l-- —--- ._... -–_. ..__ _.
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the carbonic acid ~ms containers,
,.
to the carbon tetrachloride tank,
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which supplied the pressure
was defective in some cases.
Some exting~ishers are operated by turning a handle which opens
the valve of the carbonic acid gas contaii~er. It sometZmes hap-
pened that the pilot was unable to ~ive the handle a sufficient
number of tur-nsto operate t’neextinwisher. Moreover, the con–
tainer was soclctimesfound to be empty, owing to the fact that
the valves were not absolutely tight. These two defects can be
avoided by using quick-relcase containers closed by simple tin
caps. Lack of efficiency was often tLucto slow action of the
extinguishers and bad arrangement or direction of the jets when
the currents created in the neighborhood of the engine were not
taken into consideration. Besides, the carbonic acid gas con-
tainers were sor.letimespartly OiJFty.
The-pilot was often unanrare of tliefnct that an engine had
caug”nt fire, onc of,its sides being hidden from his view. A
fire alarm should therefore be used. The installation of this
alarm is now compulsory on civil airpla-nes.
The position of the sprays or jets can be easily improved,
since a si~~lpleinspection would show whet-ncr their position
might be cha-ngcd so as to improve the efficiency of the extin-
guisher.
Several.pilots were seriously inconvenienced by carbon tetra-
chloride vapors.after using the exting~.isher. Neans should be
provided for expelling these vapors, in order to protect the
l?;
j
7.
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crew. Ti@~ness of the pi~~t cockpit would seem to be the
first step toward achieving this result. Owing to the incon-
v-eni”&lccieftirredto, the use of tetrachloride extinti~ishers
is prohibited inside of passenger cabins.
Reducing the Seriousness of Accidents
The number of accideilts should
for avoiding them. i!otwithstard.ing
be reduced by providing means
-thedegree of sa.fctyobtained,
accidents will always occur, owing to unforeseen cau~es. Ther~+
fore, efforts should ‘Desimultaneously directed toward reducing
the scrio-~sness of ~ccidcllts. In this connect ion viluablc su~.ges–
tions are furnished by experience and sone improveme:lts ccm be in-
m cdiatcl-ycmie.
It a~mcars froi~several accidents, one of ther~being partic–
ularly serious, t~iatthe troubles were due to the location of the
cab in on :lostv.lulti–engine a irpl.anes. On such an a.irploizethe.
cab in, partly projecting beyond the wines, is in the froritpart
of the fuselage, whereas t-nelu,ggageand freight compartment is
lo catcd aft. ThUS, in case of an acc ident or a violent landing,
the passcn~crs are r.loreexposed tkan the baggage since the front
end of the airplar.calways strikcs the ground first . In tile
accident just alluded to, the passengers who occupied the front
part of.the
while tliosc
gers in the
or slightly
cabin, proj ecting beyond the wings, were killed,
in the rear end escaped without injury. The passen-
ccntral nortion cf the cabin were either seriously
wounded, according to whether they were seated
-.. . .,.. . .,, ,,
f .
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forward or nft of the center. The baggage and freight showed
no sigilof damage. ,
The advantage of the unobstructed view afforded passengers
by a cabin located in the extreme front should be disregarded,
owing to the increased safety obtained by placing the baggage
room in the front end of the fuselage and the cabin farther aft.
This change should be made. At the same tirile, all proj ections
inside the cabin should be eliminat ed and careful cc,nsib.~ration
given the shape and arrangement of the seats in vie_wof Ieduc-
i-ng the seriousness of accidents. ‘T;~eseats should be firinly
secured a-ridprovided with handles, ar.d the flocr shculd.be pro-
vided with foot Tests so that the passengers ma-yhave a good
hold and brace themselves firmly when landing on bad ground.
Straps wodld serve the same purpose, but the trouble would be
to get passengers to use them.
Special accomr,oda.tious should be provided for a mech.~nic
if the ai~pla.ne has three or more engines. In normal flight
the pilot could look after the e~gines alone, but in case of
emergency, such as fire, his attention would be absorbed by the
~r eat nulfibcr of maneuvers to be attended to within a short per–
iod of time. On multi-engine airplanes it is advisable to ar-
range the engine and fire–extinguisher controls in such a way
that they may be reached either by the pilot or by the mechan–
it, ”who should always b e ready to o’bey any command..
If this plan is not adopted, the number of maneuvers ‘to
be performed by the pilot iilcase of fire should be reduced to
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a mi-nimumby grouping in a single ordinary or automatic cont~ol
for each engine the gasoline cock, the gas throttle, the igni-
tion switch, the cock of the extinguisher pipe; :,,and the cock
of the carbonic acid gas container. If the pilot has to make
all the additional maneuvers required in case of fire, while
busy with piloting a heavy airplane, looking for a good land–
ing place and perhaps maneuvering to land safely, he is liable
to be unable to take all the required safety measures and thus “
run t-herisk of a-naccident which
the airplailebeen provided with a
fire control.
inight have been avoided, had
mechanic or with a single
The airplanes which cross the British Channel every day are
not
ble
ecpipped with floats. Under these conditions, engine trou-
over the wat er may b ecome dangerous, unless immediately
remedied. During the crossing, the airplanes are flown as high
.
as possible, thus having a chance of either reaching the coast
.
or alighting near a ship.
without beiilg noticed.
pat ched if
the French
over the
But in a fog ailairplane may alight
In this case help
requested by radio or if
or British coasts siugnal
is immediately dis–
the air–survey stations on
that an airpla,ne
Ohannel has not reached its d.estination
f 1 ying
on time.
In spite of the rapidity with which help is dispatched,
some accidents have happened. In the beginning of this year,
one of
bank.
our singl& e-ngineairplanes was wrecked nea,r the Varne
Help arrived too late, although it was sent as soon as
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the accident.was reported. Quite recelitlya British airplane
sank. Fortunately the passengers were rescued by a fishing-
boat which reaci~ed tho place of the accide~~t quite by chance.
The
for
not
ncl
accKLents show that tb.emeasures taken (such as life–belts
each passenger and relief organization) wezc useful, but
sufficient to reduce to a minimum the dangers of the Chan.–
.
flight: It would s~em that this can only ‘Pe dGne by pro-
viding airpla-nes with flczting devi~es c~~able ~f knspin.~them
above the water for several ‘noursuntil b.elparrives.
Attempts to kee--an-airpltaneafloat by inflatir~~,when
alighting> Lairbags -plac~don bo’~h sides of the fus.clcage,ha-rc
as yet given no conviLlcinS results. This question should re-
ceive further attention. U eanwhile, and until a better solution
is fo-~nd,the probl~iflmi.qhtbe solved by placing a few wa.ter–
tight compartrnents iilthe fuselage of eac’hairplane designed to
cross the sea. This is ngt a very satisfactory solutior.ls i-t
means considerable addit i~nal weight, but an immediate j?icrease
o,f safety would be obtained.
The s~lution would be simpler, if onl;~the safe-tyof the
passeilgers were considered. The fuselage of an airplane might
be provided with a de-tiachabletop, so designed as to coilstitute
an excelle-ntbuoy
themselves while
m ight act-~ally be
to be detached in
to which the passengers might hold or attach
awaiting rescue. The top of the fuselage
given the fo~iilof a light nonsubmersible boat
case of
airplane itself should be
I
emergency. This buoy
painted a color which
or boat aildthe
would be very
.—
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visible on the water, in order to
remark also applies to sea-planes.
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facilitate discovery. This
While speaking of accidents on the water, attention should
be called to the importance for a seaplane of a radio ,antenna
enabling it to call for help and to indicate its position after
al ightiil,g.The antennas now in use are of ,themost primitive
type and cannot be i~lounted when tilesea is rough. In case of a
forced alight ing, the crew and the passengers of seaplanes may
fail to be rescued, owin~ to tilelack of a suitable antenna
which, lhoweverj could be easilj~designed..
Another measure for reducing the danger of a forced alight–
ing would consist in equipping a seaplane with a pump having a
larSc output. At present many seaplanes have no means for re–
movi-ng the water w’nichmcay get into the ‘nullthrough a crack
or throu~h t’neport holes. A pump m igh-tdelay the sinkiilgun-
til the arrival of help.
I shall now eif. this report on the metans for diminishing
the seriousness of accidents by considering the question of
parachutes. One might be surprised that parachutes, which have
now been brought to a high degree of perfection, have not played
a more important part in the serious accidents, conflagrations,
and failures in flight which have occurred during recent years.
The simple explanation of this fact lies in these few words:
I’Parachutes have not yet been perfectly adapted to the require–
ments of airplanes. 11
/.. . ..-.
‘ij,l
)/,,J,.i.,d
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On French airplanes with open pilot and passenger cockpits,
back and seat parachutes are used. The parachutist must stand
on the ._seatand. then jump overboard. This maneuver is difficult
to perform when the airplane is not in normal flight, as is often
the case during an accident.
On airplanes with passenger cabins it was decided to supply
parachutes to the passengers upon their request. In order to
make usc of the parachute, t’hepassenger must reach the door of
the cabiiland then jump off. This way does not seem very satis-
factory, since the passengers may be prevented from reaching the
door, should the airplane lose its equilibrium, which may be the
case if the passengers become panic-stricken and all move simul-
taneously.
The plan has also been considered of
and the walls of the cabin with openings.
providing the floor
The first plan has
been tried on an airplane, but it is far from being satisfactory,
when it is considered that the trap–door may be accidentally
opened in normal flight by an absent-minded passenger. The sec–
ond plan is more reasonable although not quite perfect, since
each passenger must open a door and jump out. It is doubtful
whether all passengers of different ages will have the necessary
self–control to jump in time. Besides, parents may hesitate to
throw their children overboard. Even if it is assumed that pas-
sengers will have the necessary self-coiltrol and decision, they
may be prevented from reaching the exits by the successive aa–
celebrations and changi-ngpositions of the airplane, of which
If- .
\
Ii
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the wiilgsor control surfaces may be broken.
A parachute with sufficient area to support the airplane
.
,.
““”and its”occupants’”has been designed abroad. Tests were even
made with it but, although it might be useful iilcase of a
failure in flight, it would be absolutely useless in case of a
conflagration, when the parachute would burn with the airplane.
There seems to be only one solution capable of doing away
wit h,the diSadVailtageS just mentioned. It was suggested by me
in 19.23,a:ld.consists in fi~’st throwiilgout the parachute which,
after filling -,~ithair, is supposed to lift the passenger from
his scat. This result could
airplanes (with cockpits) by
lage behind the head of each
which coulclbe opened by t’he
be, for instance, obtained on open
placing the parachute itithe fuse-
occupant inside of a closed housiilg
pilot. The cover of the housing
could be so desigi~ed as to throw the parachute out. It could,
moreover, serve as a guide for the parachute cords, to prevei~t
the pack frofi!unfolding before getting clear of the rudder and
out of danger of catthing. To this end, the cover could open
backward in such a way that its upper edge would extend above
the top of the rudder.
The same solution could be applied to commercial airplanes
.
~f the closed–cabin t-ype,the only difference consisting in the
arrailgeme-ntof the parachutes inside of a housing located between
the cabin roof and the top of the fuselage, behind and above the
head of each passenger. Each housing, after the release of the
JN.A. C.A. Technical Kmnorandum No.
parachute, i;li~htform the opening
would be lifted from the airplane
,.
=. by the’back of the s&t . In case
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through which the passenger
by the parachute and guided
of dangcrj the passengers
would be sil?lplyilotified to attach the belts, and the command-
ing officer, as sole judge of the situat ion, would liberate
the -parachutes at the proper time. The equilibrium of the air–
plane ‘:~ouldbc preserved hy liberating the parachutes in the
proper order. Parachutes might be used which would lift sever–
al passengers together, or eve-nparts of the cabin.
Ia order to keep this report within reasonable limits, I
shall not dis cuss acc idents resulting frorzbad ground organiza—
tion or errors of navigation in the fog. Their number is com–
parat ivcly small and will automatically decrease. Iilfact,
questions relating to &round organization are always given the
most careful mttent ioilby cou-ntricsproposi-ng to participate i-n
intern~tional air traffic, these matters being attended to as
soon as an air”line is projected. The question of increasing
.
the safcty when flying in a fog depends on the training of the
,
crew, on the navigation instruments, and on other suitable de–
vices. Nearly all the requisite instruments and devices are
now available, though they may b e further improved. Means for
rendtiring airports visible in a fog are still to be invented.
I hqve .th~refore confined rqyself to the study of only such se”r–
ious accidents as may happen again with the same frequency if
suitable means for their prevei~tion are rot adopted. It has
.-..
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b ee“nshown that, although some difficult probl~iflsare presented,
other problems can,he easil~”and quickly solvedj if the necessa–
ry means are provided.
In adriition to the air services in especial charge of air-
planes, eil.ginesand accessories, it would be of Great benefit to
orga,nize a service exclusively in charge of questions relating to
safety. This service should investigate accidents, study their
causes, suggest remedies, provide for the inspec’~ionof materials,
etc. Of course this service alone co’~ldnot be espected to solve
all the proble.ls which call for t’heatte-ntion of specially quali-
. fied technicians. For extmsive researches it would therefore be
necessary to resort to a ‘lCominitteeof Safety9‘fwhich would work
out a program of investigation for the different problems sub–
riitted to it by t’neabove service. This committee might call
a conference of experts on the particular question under invcs–
tigation, who wo”-ildoubtless feel honored to respond to such a
call.
Translation by
National Advisory Committee.
for Aeronautics.
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